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I. INTRODUCTION
Golf is a good walk spoiled.
-Mark Twain'
When Mark Twain made his humorous observation, he probably had
no idea that the link between golf and walking would one day become a
topic of national debate.' In the early months of 1998, Americans found
themselves divided over the issue of whether a disabled professional
golfer should be allowed to use a motorized cart during Professional
Golfers Association (PGA) tournaments.3 This time, however, the issue
would not be a laughing matter, as the two sides of the debate rallied
around such American icons as Arnold Palmer and Jack Nicklaus on the
one hand and the sympathetic plaintiff, Casey Martin, on the other.4
To Casey Martin, golf is not "a good walk spoiled."5 Stricken with a
disability ominously labeled Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, he
finds walking as daunting as the game of golf itself; just limping around
eighteen holes is "a victory of sorts" for him.6 Given this limitation, it
would be difficult not to see Martin as a hero in his simple request to use
a golf cart to make his way around tournament courses. Americans have
long put athletes on a pedestal and made them the topics of causes
cdl~bres.7 Disabled athletes have been the object of special adoration by
the public.8 For example, Kenny Walker has achieved fame and sympa-
thy as a football player for the University of Nebraska and the Denver
Broncos despite being deaf.' Jimmy Connors became a popular champi-
onship tennis player while afflicted with asthma.' 0 Several famous ath-
letes, such as basketball's Terry Cummings, have become sports heroes
1. GEORGE EBERL, GOLF Is A GOOD WALK SPOILED XiiI (1992).
2. See Rick Maloney, Nielsen Sides with PGA in Debate About Use of Carts, Bus. FIRST -
BuFF., Feb. 9, 1998, at 22 (describing the Casey Martin dilemma as "the topic of discussion in
the sports world these days").
3. See, e.g., Backtalk: Can Casey Get a Lift?, FLORIDA TODAY, Jan. 25, 1998, at 2C.
4. See John Garrity, Golf Plus, Out on a Limb: His Parents Hoped Casey Martin Would
Lead a Normal Life. Instead He's Living an Extraordinary One, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 9,
1998, at G10.
5. Maloney, supra note 2, at 22.
6. Id.
7. See Matthew J. Mitten, Amateur Athletes with Handicaps or Physical Abnormalities:
Who Makes the Participation Decision, 71 NEB. L. REv. 987, 993 (1992) ("Athletes are one of
the most revered groups in American society and are among its highest paid members.")
8. See id. at 989.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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while suffering from serious heart conditions." And Gail Devers won a
gold medal in the women's 100 meter dash at the Olympics even though
she has Graves disease.'2 A recent empirical study points to one of the
reasons why disabled athletes are held in such high regard for their cour-
age: these disabled sports stars "would rather play with physical pain
than suffer the emotional pain of not playing."'" Americans, it has often
been noted, love an underdog, especially one perceived as suffering spe-
cial hardship.'4
The Casey Martin debate would not remain a discussion confined to
the sports pages of newspapers. Unfortunately, like too many American
disagreements, the decision over whether to allow Martin to use a golf
cart would ultimately be decided in a courtroom.'" However, the judi-
cial decision-making would present some unique questions. Despite the
long history of public support for disabled athletes, the law had been
silent on the rights of these figures until relatively recently, and judicial
wrangling over the rights of the disabled had largely been confined to
amateur athletics.'6 The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)'7 in 1990, however, gave Martin the legal means of pursuing his
desire to use a golf cart. In fact, his case would prove to be the first to
apply this antidiscrimination law-requiring reasonable accommodation
for people with disabilities-to professional sports.'8
Using the Martin case as a backdrop, this paper will discuss how the
passage of the ADA has affected the rights of disabled athletes. Part II
will outline a history of disability discrimination laws in the United
States, particularly as they affect athletics. Part III will discuss how these
statutes had been applied to disabled athletes by courts in the years pre-
ceding the Martin case. Part IV will discuss the Martin case in detail,
including a history of the PGA, a biography of Casey Martin himself,
and a discussion of the public debate that preceded and followed the
trial. After examining all of these issues, the paper will conclude by as-
11. See id.
12. Mitten, supra note 7, at 989.
13. Id. at 994. Mitten also notes that "[e]conomic pressure such as the loss of a potential
scholarship or professional career or the fear of losing a starting position provides strong in-
centive to any star athlete to play with a handicap or impairment." Id.
14. See Dateline NBC (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 22, 1998) (transcript available at
1998 WL 6615281).
15. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998); Martin v. PGA Tour,
Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998).
16. See Mitten, supra note 7, at 1003-04.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
18. See Dateline NBC, supra note 14.
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serting that the Martin case, though not legally earth shattering in its
holding, may ultimately prove to be a watershed event by injecting the
ADA into professional sports.
II. A HISTORY OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Pre-ADA Statutes
Before the ADA was passed, several statutes protected the rights of
the disabled in the United States. Congress took tentative steps toward
eliminating discrimination against the disabled when it passed the Reha-
bilitation Act in 1973.19 Section 504 of that Act provides that "[n]o
otherwise qualified [disabled] individual with a disability in the United
States... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrim-
ination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assist-
ance." 0 As part of its legal bite, "the Rehabilitation Act requires
federally funded programs to make reasonable accommodations [for]
disabled persons."21 In order for a plaintiff to successfully bring suit
against a defendant, he must prove four elements: "1) he is 'disabled'
under the Rehabilitation Act; 2) he is 'otherwise qualified' to participate
in the activity or program in question; 3) he was excluded from the activ-
ity or program solely on the basis of his disability; and 4) the activity or
program receives federal funding., 22 The Rehabilitation Act remains an
important piece of legislation to this day for several reasons. First, many
sports programs are recipients of federal aid, particularly high school
and college activities. Second, the ADA works in conjunction with the
Rehabilitation Act in many ways, even though it subsumes the earlier
statute in some respects and extends beyond any previous statutory pro-
visions to provide clearer regulations3 3 Most important, however, is the
analogy that courts often draw between the Rehabilitation Act and the
19. See Jason L. Thomas, Comment, Through the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, High
School Athletes are Saying "Put Me In Coach": Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic
Ass'n, 65 C. L. REv. 727, 730 (1997).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994); Thomas, supra note 19, at 730; Julia V. Kasperski, Disabled
High School Athletes and the Right to Participate: Are Age Waivers Reasonable Modifications
Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 49 BAYLOR L. REv.
175, 178 (1997).
21. Thomas, supra note 19, at 736.
22. Pahulu v. Univ. of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (D. Kan. 1995); see also Mitten, supra
note 7, at 1008.
23. See Thomas, supra note 19, at 738.
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ADA; courts have repeatedly used decisions on the Rehabilitation Act
as precedent to formulate holdings on the ADA.2 4 This is a valuable link
for ADA plaintiffs, for the mere fact that the Rehabilitation Act is sev-
enteen years older than the ADA means that there is much more case
law on point involving the older statute32
In the years between passage of the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA, Congress took further steps to eliminate discrimination against
the disabled. Perhaps the strongest legislation existed in the area of edu-
cation.26 For example, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA)2 7 is a civil rights statute that requires schools to provide dis-
abled students an "individualized education plan" so that they can re-
ceive an "appropriate" education. 2 Part of an appropriate education is
athletics, so the IDEA presumably applies to school sports activities. 29
Other statutes that Congress passed in the years leading up to the ADA
included the Developmental Disabilities Bill of Rights Act of 1975, the
Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly
24. See Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir.
1995)("Our analysis of the plaintiffs' ADA claim closely tracks our [Rehabilitation Act] sec-
tion 504 analysis."); Bolton v. Scrivner, 36 F.3d 939, 943 (10th Cir. 1994)("Congress intended
that the relevant caselaw developed under the Rehabilitation Act be generally applicable to
the term 'disability' as used in the ADA."); Reaves v. Mills, 904 F. Supp. 120, 123 (W.D.N.Y.
1995)(taking to heart the ADA's language that "[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set
forth in ... [section 504a of the Rehabilitation Act] shall be the remedies, procedures, and
rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability
in violation of [the ADA]"); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 890 F. Supp. 1391, 1403 (S.D.
Ind. 1995) ("[T]he ADA is to be interpreted consistently with the Rehabilitation Act.").
25. This is probably why attorneys often bring suits under both statutes to this day.
Though the many Rehabilitation Act decisions would apply to the ADA, lawyers often appear
to be more comfortable when precedent directly addresses a statute by name. In addition, it
never hurts to bring suit under two statutes when possible rather than under the ADA alone.
Of course, this is impossible if the defendant is not a recipient of federal funds, as the Casey
Martin case illustrates. The extension of the ADA into activities not funded by the federal
government is probably its most dramatic development. See infra Parts II and III for further
discussion of the interplay between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA in case law.
26. See RuTH COLKER, Tr LAW OF DisABILrry DIscRmINATION 19 (1995 & Supp. 1996-
97).
27. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1491 (1994).
28. COLKER, supra note 26, at 19. "In order for a school district to be covered by the
IDEA, it must accept federal funding and agree to abide by an extensive set of funding crite-
ria." Id.
29. Despite this fact, it is doubtful that IDEA goes very far in the area of reasonable
accommodations for the disabled. For example, in Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 178 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a school did not have to employ an interpreter
for a deaf student in order to meet IDEA's requirements. Given this decision, one can only
imagine the hesitancy to require accommodations for athletic programs under IDEA. See
COLKER, supra note 26, at 19. The ADA has helped fill this gap by mandating more exacting
accommodations for the disabled in all areas of education, including athletics. See id.
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and Handicapped Act of 1984, and the Fair Housing Act Amendments
of 1988.30
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
In 1990, Congress sought to ensure that the federal government
would play an even bigger role in ensuring the rights of the disabled
when it passed the ADA." Finding a "continuing existence of unfair
and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice"32 against the disabled,
Congress sweepingly sought "the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities."33 Drafted by Senator Tom Harkin, and
backed by Senator Bob Dole,34 "[t]he ADA prohibits discrimination on
the basis of disability in employment, programs and services provided by
state and local governments, goods and services provided by private
companies, and in commercial facilities. ' 35 When "President [Bush]
signed the ADA into law on July 26, 1990, '' 36 he described it as "the
world's first comprehensive declaration of equality for people with disa-
bilities."37 The ADA was subsequently codified under five Titles.38 In
the parts most relevant to sports law, "Title I covers private employment
discrimination; Title II covers the provision of programs and services by
state and local governments; and Title III covers the provision of services
by public accommodations and commercial facilities such as restaurants,
30. See COLKER, supra note 26, at 19.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3)-(4) (1994).
32. Id. § 12101(a)(9).
33. Id. § 12101(b)(1).
34. See Garrity, supra note 4.
35. Americans with Disabilities (ADA) Homepage of the U.S. Department of Justice (vis-
ited March 6, 1998) <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/adahoml.htm>. Readers should note that
this coverage marks a big difference over the Rehabilitation Act, for the federal government
now had the power to go after institutions that were not recipients of federal funding.
36. See ADA HANDBOOK, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION: STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND
RELATED MATERIALS 92 (1995).
37. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implica-
tions of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413, 413-14
(1991) (quoting remarks made by President Bush during the ADA signing ceremony).
38. See ADA HANonOOK, supra note 36, at i.
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hotels, and .. ."-most applicable here-golf courses.3 9 The arrival of
these Titles "has resulted in a booming area of law" for the disabled.4"
The ADA requires the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to issue regulations and guidelines implementing Title I; a simi-
lar provision requires the Department of Justice (DOJ) to issue federal
regulations governing Titles II and 111.41 These regulations are very im-
portant, for the Supreme Court has stated that they "are of significant
assistance" in fleshing out the basic provisions of federal disability dis-
crimination statutes.42 When Casey Martin brought his ADA claim
against the PGA, he based his claims on Titles I and III. 41 Thus, a closer
examination of these two titles is helpful to understanding the rest of this
article.
1. Title I of the ADA
Title I states rather bluntly that "[n]o covered entity shall discrimi-
nate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disabil-
ity of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 44
Looking at the plain language of this passage, it is clear that one must
first prove himself to be "disabled." There are several ways that a person
can be qualified as disabled: 1) having "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the 'major life activities of such
39. Id. For the record, Title IV covers telecommunications relay services for hearing and
speech impaired individuals (including closed-captioning of public service announcements),
and Title V contains miscellaneous provisions such as special rules for insurance providers. See
ia- Though possibly of indirect importance to matters of sports law, these last two Titles will
not be discussed in this paper, with the following brief exception: Section 12212 (in Title V)
encourages alternative dispute resolution as a means of resolving disputes under the ADA.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12212. However, one federal court has ruled that this section does not require
an athlete to arbitrate his discrimination claims against an athletic association because this
provision was meant to supplement, not supplant, judicial remedies. See Case Law Develop-
ment: Mobility/Access, 20 Mnr'rAL & PHYsicAL DisABarry L. REP. 382, 386 (citing Devlin v.
Arizona Youth Soccer Ass'n, No. Civ. 95-745 TUC ACM (D. Ariz. Feb. 8, 1996)).
40. COLKER, supra note 26, at xvii.
41. See id. There is one exception to this provision: the Department of Transportation is
charged with issuing regulations to enforce the transportation aspects of Title III. See id. As
another important side note, the ADA requires DOJ to issue regulations governing Title II
which are consistent with the existing regulations under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
yet another link between the two statutes. See id.
42. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987) (discussing Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services regulations issued pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act).
43. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (D. Or. 1998).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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individual';45 2) having a record of such impairment; or 3) being re-
garded as having such an impairment. 46
According to Congress, qualifying as disabled should be rather com-
mon under these three prongs, for the findings which introduce the
ADA state that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical
or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing . . . ."' At times,
however, proving that one is disabled can be a tough burden, or at least a
confusing one. For example, rejection for one job application due to
physical impairments, by itself, has been repeatedly held to lack the im-
pact necessary to prove the ADA's prerequisite that a person is substan-
tially limited in the life activity of work under the first prong of the
ADA's disability definition, assuming of course that the person is able to
work elsewhere.48 On the other hand, under the third prong of the defi-
nition ("being regarded as having such an impairment"), if a prospective
employer treats an impairment (either actual or perceived) as substan-
tially limiting one or more of life's major activities, and discriminates
based on this treatment, then a person is deemed "disabled" and a viola-
tion of the ADA has occurred. This is especially true when the prospec-
tive employer treats a perceived disability as a blanket disqualifier for
employment.4 9 Under this reasoning, even a single refusal to hire based
on this perception may adequately make out a case of an employee "be-
ing regarded as having such an impairment"; in other words, a pattern of
45. "Major life activities" include functions such as "caring for oneself, performing man-
ual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(l). Sports may qualify by themselves as a "major life activity" under the ADA. As
one federal court has put it, "some courts and commentators ... have concluded athletics
comes within the purview of 'learning,' [an] enumerated major life activity, and others have
implied athletics in and of itself is a major life activity for certain individuals." Pahulu, 897 F.
Supp. at 1391. Interestingly, the EEOC has stated that "[t]he determination of whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis,
without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices."
Americans with Disabilities Act Title I Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Inter-
pretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20). The EEOC's guidance seems to conflict with the
language of the ADA itself, which requires that a disability "substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities" before it is covered. Compare id., with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)
47. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).
48. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)((3)(I) ("The inability to perform a single, particular job does
not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working."); see also Taylor v.
U. S. Postal Serv., 946 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir. 1991); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir.
1994); Byrne v. Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1992).
49. See Cook v. R.I., 10 F.3d 17, 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
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such perceptions may not be necessary." These are subtle distinctions,
but ones that could make or break a plaintiff's case.
Returning to the plain language of the ADA's prohibition of discrim-
ination, having proven that he is disabled, a plaintiff must next prove
that he is nonetheless "qualified" for the job in question. 1 To be "quali-
fied," the person must be able to "perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires."52 It is the
definition of "essential functions" that often proves a sticky point for
litigants under the ADA.5 3
Finally, to succeed under Title I's plain language, a plaintiff must
prove that he has been discriminated against in an employment situa-
tion.54 Employment discrimination includes not only excluding one from
employment based on a disability, but also "not making reasonable ac-
commodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an other-
wise qualified individual with a disability."55
Courts looking at the plain language of the ADA have begun to en-
capsulate these elements and the associated burdens of proof. To estab-
lish a prima facie disparate employment treatment case under the ADA,
the employee has the initial burden of proving that he is a disabled per-
son, "that he or she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the
job (either with or without reasonable accommodation), and that he or
she has suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances
from which an inference of unlawful discrimination arises."56 In meeting
this initial burden, the employee need only show that the discrimination
based on disability was "a" cause of the action taken, not necessarily the
50. Id.
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
53. See, e.g., Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 477 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that even
rarely-performed duties can be essential functions of a job); Davis v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 447,
454 (N.D. Il. 1989) (addressing whether answering the phone was an essential function of a
postal clerk's position); Ackerman v. Western Elec., 643 F. Supp. 836, 844 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(finding that an employee's actual prior tasks-versus her job description-determine what
are the essential functions of a job).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A). "Reasonable accommodation" requires "making existing fa-
cilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities," Id.
at § 12111(9)(A), and making "[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to
the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily per-
formed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions
of that position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(ii).
56. Price v. S-B Power Tool, 75 F.3d 362 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 274 (1996).
1998]
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"sole" cause.57 If the employee is successful in this initial step, the em-
ployer would then have the burden of proving that the employee was not
an otherwise qualified person or that the alleged discrimination was for
reasons other than the disability.58 Finally, if the employer is successful
with its argument, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that
the employer's reasons for the alleged actions are based on misconcep-
tions or unfounded conclusions, and that the reasons articulated for the
alleged action entail unjustified consideration of the disability.5 9
Another factor that affects Title I is the traditional law of disparate
impact. Under the ADA, an employer may not use selection criteria or
tests that "tend to screen out" qualified disabled employees unless the
criteria "is shown to be job-related for the position in question."6 ° To
make out a prima facie case in such disparate impact situations, the
plaintiff need only prove that the challenged standard disparately im-
pacts the group of disabled people of which he is a member, and that the
plaintiff is otherwise qualified for the position.61 The burden then shifts
back to the employer to prove that the challenged tests are job-related
or are required by business necessity.62
Before ending the discussion of Title I, it should be noted that de-
fendants have several general defenses against employment discrimina-
tion claims. First, an employer does not have to hire a disabled person if
that person would constitute a "direct threat to the health or safety of
other individuals in the workplace. '63 The EEOC has extended this de-
fense by regulation to cover situations where the individual may be a
direct threat to himself instead of others.6 However, the direct threat
defense is a high hurdle for defendants, for the EEOC has deemed that
the threat to personal safety may not involve "slightly increased risk.
The risk can only be considered when it poses a significant risk, i.e., high
probability, of substantial harm. '65
57. See Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 4 A.D. Cases 1051, 1055 (3d Cir. 1995).
58. See Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1384 (10th Cir. 1981).
59. See id. at 1385.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6); see also Davis v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Ill. 1989). In
contrast, one federal court has stated that "it remains ... an open question whether [the
Rehabilitation Act] forbids recipients of federal financial assistance from engaging in 'conduct
that has an unjustifiable disparate impact' on the disabled." Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1032.
61. See Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 306 (5th Cir. 1980).
62. See id.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
64. See Chiari v. City of League City, 920 F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 1991)(citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1613.702(0 (1990)).
65. Americans with Disabilities Act Title I Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). The EEOC further explains that, in weighing
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Another defense available to employers is proof that a reasonable
accommodation would constitute an "undue hardship" due to "signifi-
cant difficulty or expense" in achieving it.66 "In determining whether an
accommodation would cause undue hardship on a covered entity,"
courts consider the following factors, among others: "the nature and
[net] cost of the accommodation..., the overall financial resources" of
the employer, and the impact of the accommodation upon the operation
of the employer's facility.67
2. Title III of the ADA
Title III broadly states that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation."6 Turning once
more to the plain language of the statute, a defendant must first be
shown to be a place of public accommodation under Title 11.69 In flesh-
ing out the entities covered by this first element, section 12181(7) of the
statute gives a very detailed list of facilities that qualify as a public ac-
commodation, including among many others a "golf course, or other
place of exercise or recreation. '7° One commentator has noted that "[a]
type of entity that is not explicitly covered [by section 12181(7)] but
would seem to fit many of the criteria of other covered entities is 'profes-
sional or business organizations'," which could easily include such sports
organizations as the NCAA or PGA.71 It should additionally be noted
the direct threat, the employer must make an individual assessment using factual data, consid-
ering potential reasonable accommodations, and taking into account four factors: the duration
of the risk, the nature and severity of the potential harm, the likelihood that the harm will
occur, and the imminence of the potential harm. See id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(r).
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10), 12112(b)(5)(A).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2). For a list of other Title I defenses
available to an employer, see 42 U.S.C. § 12113, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15, and Americans with
Disabilities Act Title I Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Interpretive Guidance,
29 C.F.R. § 1630.15.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
69. Title III uses the same definition of "disabled" as Title I. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L). Moreover, the DOI regulations implementing this provision
state that a "facility means all or any portion of ... sites." 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
71. COLKER, supra note 26, at 345. Colker uses the American Bar Association as a spe-
cific example, see id., but this definition could presumably apply to such organizations as the
NCAA or PGA as well. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (D. Or. 1998)
("It is also worth noting that the ADA does not distinguish between sports organizations and
other entities when it comes to applying the ADA to a specific situation. Businesses and
schools have rules governing their operations which are of equal importance (in their sphere)
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that a separate provision of Title III, section 12189, is equally determina-
tive in deciding whether an entity is covered as a public accommodation,
for it states that "[a]ny person that offers examinations or courses re-
lated to applications, licensing, certifications, or credentialing for secon-
dary or post-secondary education, professional, or trade purposes shall
offer such examinations or courses in a place and manner accessible to
persons with disabilities or offer alternative accessible arrangements for
such individuals. '7 2 Any sports organization that falls within this defini-
tion would thus qualify as a public accommodation.
Once a defendant is proven to be a public accommodation, the next
step is to show that it has discriminated against a disabled person in
some manner under the text of Title III. There are several ways that a
public accommodation can discriminate under Title III, and each specific
offense carries its own particular defense. For example:
-Section 12182(b)(2)(i) deems the imposition of eligibility criteria that
tends to screen out disabled individuals discriminatory "unless [the
screening] can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the
service."73
-Section 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) deems "a failure to make a 'reasonable
modification' in policies" affecting public accommodations discrimina-
tory unless it can be shown that the "modification would fundamen-
tally alter" the services or facilities. 74
-Section 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) states that a public accommodation dis-
criminates when it fails to take steps to ensure that the disabled are
not treated differently because of the absence of auxiliary aids and
services, unless the provision of these would fundamentally alter the
nature of the service/facility or would result in an undue burden.75
-Section 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) states that "a failure to remove architec-
tural barriers [or] communication barriers" in places of public accom-
as the rules of sporting events. Conversely, the disabled have just as much interest in being
free from discrimination in the athletic world as they do in other aspects of everyday life. The
key questions are the same: does the ADA apply, and may a reasonable modification be made
to accommodate a disabled individual?")
72. 42 U.S.C. § 12189. This provision figured into the Casey Martin case, as the PGA
conducts a qualifying school tournament for golfers who wish to join the pro tour. See Martin
v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1321-22 (D. Or. 1998).
73. COLKER, supra note 26, at 344.
74. Readers should note that the "reasonable accommodation" language that is used in
Title I has a counterpart in the "reasonable modification" language of Title III. Id.
75. Though the DOJ has largely been silent on what constitutes a "fundamental altera-
tion," the applicable regulations define undue burden as "significant difficulty or expense." 28
C.F.R. § 36.303(a).
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modation is discriminatory if it affects access for the disabled, but only
where such removal is "readily achievable."76
In further explaining all of these potential violations, the DOJ regula-
tions require a public accommodation to afford facilities "in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual."7 7
In addition to the specific defenses available under the individual cat-
egories of discrimination, there are some general defenses available
under Title III. Perhaps the most important for the Casey Martin case is
the simple exception that Title III does "not apply to private clubs or
establishments."78 Another example is the "direct threat" defense,
which is described in terms similar to what we saw under Title I. Once
again, the direct threat defense is a high hurdle for defendants, for Title
III itself and the DOJ regulations define this defense as "a significant
risk to the health or safety of others" by the disabled individuals, require
an individualized assessment of such risk, and demand that defendants
consider modifications and auxiliary aids/services to eliminate such risks
if they are found to exist.79
C. The Critics of the ADA
Despite its lofty goals, the ADA has been a source of controversy
since its passage, with many arguing that it reaches too far into every
aspect of American society.80 One of the most vocal critics has been
attorney Philip K. Howard, who wrote the 1994 best-selling book THE
DEATH OF COMMON SENSE. 81 Though largely sympathetic toward the
plight of the disabled, 2 Mr. Howard spends several pages of his book
76. Title III defines "readily achievable" as "easily accomplishable and able to be carried
out without much difficulty or expense," an apparently easier standard for defendants than the
undue burden definition. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). This is not the end of the inquiry under this
provision, however, for Title III goes on to explain that when the removal of a barrier is not
readily achievable, a public accommodation is still guilty of discrimination if it fails to imple-
ment alternative methods of providing access to its facilities. See id. at § 12182(b)(A)(v). This
additional provision is also subject to the "readily achievable" defense, however. See id.
77. 28 C.F.R. § 36.203(a).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12187.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3); 28 C.F.R. § 36.208; see also Anderson v. Little League Base-
ball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342 (D. Ariz. 1992).
80. See generally John J. Coleman, III & Marcel L. Debruge, A Practitioner's Introduction
to ADA Title 11, 45 ALA. L. REV. 55 (1993).
81. PHILIP K. HOWARD, TiH DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW is SUFFOCATING
AMERICA (1994).
82. See id. at 129 (noting that, prior to passage of the Rehabilitation Act, "[d]isabled citi-
zens had been largely ignored by law, probably because of society's tendency to want to forget
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pointing out some unfortunate paradoxes of the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA. For example:
-Largely because of the dictates of federal disability laws, "[g]ifted stu-
dents, in contrast with disabled children, receive virtually no support
or attention from America's school systems .... The ratio of funding
of special education programs to gifted programs is about eleven dol-
lars to one cent."8 3
-The ADA fails to acknowledge that "what benefits a person with one
disability may harm someone with another disability. Low drinking
fountains and telephones are harder to use for the elderly or those
with bad backs .... Curb cuts are more dangerous for the blind, who
have more difficulty knowing when they have reached the end of the
block. 84
-Though the ADA purports to protect upwards of 43 million
Americans,
the overwhelming preponderance of the ADA regulations,.
and virtually all cost and conflict, relate to wheelchair users ....
It turns out, in a number that seems to have been actively sup-
pressed [in the Congressional findings], that not 2[sic] percent of
the disabled are in wheelchairs, and many of those are confined to
nursing homes. Billions are being spent to make every nook and
cranny of every facility in America wheelchair accessible ....
when children die of malnutrition and finish almost dead last in
math. 5
-"Under ADA regulations, doorknobs are now illegal in the workplace
(they are hard to turn for someone without full use of his hands). So
is carpet that is more than one quarter-inch thick (it causes too much
friction for wheelchairs.) 81 6
In summing up his criticisms of the ADA, Mr. Howard notes that
"[t]he ADA gave the disabled the right to sue virtually every establish-
ment, public or private, for discrimination,"87 but argues that the fight
for rights under the ADA has become "obsessive" and that handing out
these rights "does not resolve conflict. It aggravates it."88
about the misfortunes of those suffering from serious handicaps. Indignities were their daily
routine: To someone in a wheelchair, every six-inch curb, every step, is like a high wall.")
83. Id. at 151.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 153.
86. HowAlR, supra note 81, at 130-31.
87. Id. at 130.
88. Id. at 150.
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Mr. Howard has found a kindred spirit in the most unlikely of places,
for a few African-American leaders have noted that the ADA poten-
tially dilutes the advances of the black civil rights movement.8 9 One
such leader well-known to Georgians, Julian Bond, has caustically made
some observations about the growth of rights symbolized by the ADA:
Today, the protected classes extend to a majority of all Ameri-
cans, including white men over forty, short people, the chemically
addicted, the left-handed, the obese, members of all religions.
Surely there is a scholar somewhere who can tell us how we came
to this state of affairs and how the road to civil rights became so
crowded.... In our society, there were only so many fruits to go
around. When short, fat, old white men step to the front of the
line ... then our civil rights are as endangered as they were by
Bull Connor .... 90
Critics of the ADA have not confined themselves to general discus-
sions of the law, for tough comments have accompanied the statute's
foray into sports law. For example, Professor Matthew Mitten has com-
mented on the dilemma faced by Loyola Marymount University over the
disability of star basketball player Hank Gathers.9' Gathers suffered
from a known irregular heartbeat.92 When he collapsed and died during
a basketball game, the university was sued heavily in two suits.93 Yet
Mitten notes that, "[i]ronically, Loyola Marymount's refusal to permit
Gathers to continue playing basketball with his heart condition also
could have resulted in litigation" under the ADA.94 This obviously
presents tough choices for some sports programs. Equally biting criti-
cisms have accompanied the Casey Martin case. Syndicated columnist
Tony Snow, though largely sympathetic tovard Martin himself, takes a
dim view of the ADA, arguing that "the feds ought to butt out. The
government already has an annoying knack for making everybody's
business its "business-with the result that federal 'help' costs more and
does less good than ever."9 Finally, Sports Illustrated magazine, in com-
menting on the Martin case, has quipped that the ADA "has pushed
sports enterprises like [the PGA] to the mouth of a very dark cave" and
89. See id. at 132.
90. Id. at 132-33.
91. See Matthew J. Mitten, Sports Participation by "Handicapped" Athletes, 10 EiNT. &
SPORTS L. 15, 15 (1992).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Tony Snow, Editorial: PGA Needs to Do Right Thing for Casey Martin, FLORIDA To-
DAY, Jan. 19, 1998, at 9A.
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"has invited a rash of litigation that is testing the best minds in sports
and law." 96 This alleged rash of litigation is our next topic of discussion.
III. PRIOR COURT CASES INVOLVING DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
IN SPORTS LAW
Bringing lawsuits to support the rights of the disabled is largely a
twentieth century phenomenon.97 One commentator has observed that
the use of lawsuits to support the rights of the disabled-particularly
disabled athletes-is inherently unfortunate. Instead, he argues that
"[t]he decision to participate in ... sports should be the product of mu-
tual agreement between the handicapped or physically impaired athlete
and family, school officials, and physicians."98 One should not forget
that the ADA itself urges "the use of alternative means of dispute reso-
lution.., to resolve disputes." 99 Despite these earnest appeals, like too
many facets of American life, these decisions have often spilled into the
courtroom. The complaints by plaintiffs have generally involved two ar-
eas: constitutional claims and statutory claims (under the Rehabilitation
Act and/or ADA).
A. Constitutional Claims
The use of constitutional claims on behalf of the disabled has seen a
rather brief and now largely settled history. One of the earliest suits spe-
cifically involving a disabled athlete was Neeld v. American Hockey
League,' in which a hockey player claimed that the league's policy ban-
ning one-eyed players violated the Equal Protection Clause.101 This case
is interesting because the court rejected the Equal Protection Clause
claim when it found that the action resulted from private conduct, not
state action subject to constitutional scrutiny; however, the court also
included in dicta the statement that a disabled athlete has an enforceable
constitutional right to participate in college sports if such program con-
stitutes state action.'02 Despite this promising language for disabled ath-
96. John Garrity, Taking One for the Team Battered by the Martin Case, 7Tm Finchem
Nonetheless Deserves Respect, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 23, 1998, at 63.
97. See COLKER, supra note 26, at 3.
98. Mitten, supra note 91, at 15; see also Mitten, supra note 7, at 990.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12212.
100. 439 F. Supp. 459 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
101. See Mitten, supra note 7, at 1004. The plaintiff was successful on claims brought
under state employment discrimination laws, however. See infra section II.B.3.
102. See Mitten, supra note 7, at 1004.
[Vol. 9:1
WHY IS THE PGA TEED OFF?
letes, no other court has recognized a fundamental right to play college
or high school sports.10 3
Other attempts to lay constitutional claims for the disabled (and dis-
abled athletes in particular) have met similar doom, mainly because of a
watershed disability case heard by the Supreme Court in 1985, City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.' 4 Cleburne involved mentally re-
tarded citizens who sued under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, claiming they were members of a protected class
(i.e. the disabled) much like members of racial minorities. 5 If this argu-
ment had been successful, the actions of the defendant in requiring
building permits for group homes for the retarded would have been sub-
ject to "heightened scrutiny," a very tough hurdle for defendants. 06
However, the Court disagreed with the plaintiffs and found that they
were not part of a protected class; thus, the Equal Protection Clause only
required a much easier rationality test.'0 7 In the wake of Cleburne, a
"school can justify the exclusion of [certain] handicapped athletes from
its athletics program if its decision is rationally related to a legitimate
objective."'08
Suits have also attempted to invoke the Due Process Clause as a
method of securing rights.'0 9 These attempts have largely been unsuc-
cessful, and one commentator has noted that there is little chance that
one could successfully prove there is a liberty or property interest in
playing interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics; thus, there is little way
to argue a violation of due process in these settings." 0 Even if the dis-
abled athlete could prove a property or liberty interest, however, a team
"could rationally justify such exclusion based on concern for the athlete's
health [or other justifications].""' This reasoning may doom due pro-
cess claims in the professional sports world as well.
103. Id. at 1005.
104. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
105. See id. at 437.
106. See id. at 440-42.
107. See id. at 446. A couple of caveats should be noted, however. First, despite the
Court's rule, it found that the actions of the defendant did not pass the rationality test. See id.
at 448-50. Thus, it could be said that the disabled community won the battle but lost the war
in this case. Secondly, Justice Marshall argued in dissent that the mentally retarded should be
a quasi-suspect class because of the interest in establishing a home and the tragic history of
discrimination against the retarded. See id. at 460-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. Mitten, supra note 7, at 1005.
109. See Mitten, supra note 91, at 17.
110. See id.
111. Id.
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Given this history, the bottom line on constitutional claims appears
to be that they are largely ineffective in the context of disabled athletes.
The futility of constitutional claims has been offset, however, by the en-
actment of statutes prohibiting discrimination against the disabled.
B. Statutory Claims
The use of statutory law as a basis for lawsuits has a richer history
than constitutional claims. Perhaps the first attempt to seek a judicial
remedy for discrimination against the disabled occurred in 1934, when a
father unsuccessfully sued a school system under an Ohio statute to have
his mentally retarded son admitted to public school.112 The enactments
of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA have resulted in more and more
private litigants asserting discrimination claims in the courts. 3 Unlike
the federal constitution, these statutes require a "substantial justifica-
tion" rather than a mere rational basis for discriminating against a dis-
abled athlete."14 Before the Casey Martin case, these statutes had never
been applied to professional sports. 15 However, a wide variety of claims
had been brought at the high school and collegiate levels, disabled
coaches had sued over discriminatory job requirements under the ADA,
and some disabled professional athletes had brought state claims based
on laws similar to the ADA. These prior cases, especially the high
school and college athletics cases, provide some persuasive precedent for
the new link between the ADA and professional sports, as the court in
the Martin case noted:
Although the PGA Tour is a professional sports organization and
professional sports enjoys certainly, a much higher profile and
display of skills than collegiate or other lower levels of competi-
tive sports, the analysis of the issues does not change from one
level to the next. High school athletic associations have just as
much interest in the equal application of their rules and the integ-
rity of their games as do professionals." 6
112. See Board of Educ. v. State ex rel. Goldman, 191 N.E. 914 (1934) ("Apparently this
is a case of first impression in Ohio, and counsel have been unable to find a case anywhere in
the United States which gives the right to exclude from all educational facilities any child
within the prescribed ages upon the basis of an intelligence test. It is, therefore, necessary to
look to the provisions of the statutes of Ohio with reference to the right to refuse this child
admission to the schools."); see also COLYER, supra note 26, at 3.
113. See Thomas, supra note 19, at 741.
114. Mitten, supra note 91, at 19.
115. See Dateline NBC, supra note 14.
116. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (D. Or. 1998).
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1. The High School Cases
State high school athletic associations generally ban students who
turn nineteen prior to the start of the school year from participating in
sports.117 The reasons for this widespread ban are threefold: 1) "to pre-
vent a competitive advantage for teams that use older players""l8 ; 2) "to
protect younger [presumably smaller] players from injury;"' "i9 and 3) "to
discourage 'red-shirting,' the practice of delaying education to gain ath-
letic maturity.' 2 At times, these policies have inadvertently affected
the eligibility of students who were held back in school purely because of
a learning disability. Courts have differed as to whether waiver of these
age requirements is a reasonable modification under the federal disabil-
ity discrimination statutes. 2 '
The early trend among courts seemed to be that the federal laws re-
quired a waiver of the age requirement when it came to disabled ath-
letes. For example, the Court of Appeals of Texas, in the 1993 case of
University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan,'22 examined the ban im-
posed by the defendant League (which regulated high school athletics in
Texas), finding that "the underlying purpose of the over-19 rule is to
ensure the safety of the participating student athletes and the equality of
competitors."'' Buchanan, who had been held back in school because
of a learning disability, requested a waiver of the League rule so that he
could play football, a move the League resisted. 24 Because Buchanan
had not participated in red-shirting and was average in size for the team,
the court found that the concerns that made the rule necessary were not
present if he were allowed to play." Thus, as the court reasoned, "[a]
waiver mechanism for the over-19 rule would permit the [League] to
consider the facts of particular situations in order to make individualized
determinations as to the enforcement of the rule. Such determinations
are reasonable accommodations.' 26
The reasoning of the Buchanan case found support shortly thereafter
in a federal court. In Johnson v. Florida High School Activities Associa-
117. See Kasperski, supra note 20, at 186.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. IM
121. See Kasperski, at 176, 186 & 193.
122. 848 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (addressing the IDEA and Rehabilitation Act).
123. Id. at 300.
124. See id. at 300.
125. See id. at 301-02.
126. Id. at 302.
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tion, Inc., 27 the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida in
1995 addressed a situation very similar to the Buchanan case. Johnson
had been held back in school because of a hearing disability, preventing
his participation in high school sports under the Florida over-19 rule.12s
Much like the Buchanan court, the district court here held that;
"[r]esolution of this issue requires an examination of the purposes of the
age requirement as applied to the instant case."' 9 It quickly reasoned
that:
[T]he relationship between the age requirement and its purposes
must be such that waiving the age requirement in the instant case
would necessarily undermine the purposes of the requirement
.... [W]aiving the age requirement in the instant case does not
fundamentally alter the nature of the program .... Therefore,
waiving the age requirement constitutes a 'reasonable accommo-
dation' and must be undertaken. 30
Despite these victories for plaintiffs, the tide in the over-19 cases
seems to be turning toward the defendants. The first wave of this tide
came in 1994 with the Eighth Circuit decision in Pottgen v. Missouri State
High School Activities Association.131 Pottgen, much like the other liti-
gants discussed above, was held back in school because of a learning
disability, which made him ineligible to play high school baseball. 32 The
court here rather bluntly stated that "the age limit is an essential eligibil-
ity requirement of the interscholastic baseball program," however.133 It
then explained that "[wlaiving an essential eligibility standard would
constitute a fundamental alteration in the nature of the baseball pro-
gram. Other than waiving the age limit, no manner, method, or means is
available which would permit Pottgen to satisfy the age limit. Conse-
quently, no reasonable accommodation exists."' 34 In stark contrast to
the Buchanan and Johnson cases, the court took specific issue with the
argument that these situations required an individualized "essential eligi-
127. 899 F. Supp. 579 (M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997).
128. See id. at 581-82.
129. Id. at 584.
130. Id. at 585-86 & n.8. For comments on other federal district court cases sympathetic
to plaintiffs in the over-19 rule setting, see Kasperski, supra note 20, at 188 & n.82 (citing
Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 663 (D. Conn.), rev'd
in part, appeal dismissed in part, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996)), and Thomas, supra note 19, at 744-
45 (citing Booth v. Univ. Interscholastic League, No. Civ. A-90-CA-764, 1990 WL 484414
(W.D. Tex. 1990)).
131. 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994).
132. See id. at 927-28.
133. Id. at 931.
134. Id. at 930.
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bility requirement" inquiry, reasoning that if this were required "[a] pub-
lic entity would never know the outer boundaries of its 'services,
programs, or activities.' ... Clearly the ADA imposes no such duty."'1 35
Given this reasoning, the court held that waiving the rule is not a reason-
able modification. 136
Pottgen was quickly followed in 1995 by the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, Inc.137 Under a
similar fact pattern, the Sandison court quickly sided with the Pottgen
decision:
[W]e agree with the court in Pottgen that waiver of the age restric-
tion fundamentally alters the sports program .... Removing the
age restriction injects into competition students older than the
vast majority of other students, and the record shows that the
older students are generally more physically mature than younger
students. Expanding the sports program to include older students
works a fundamental alteration ....
[T]he plaintiffs are not subjected to "discrimination on the basis
of disability," and waiver is not in this case a "reasonable
modification.' 138
The Pottgen and Sandison decisions seem to be holding water, as they
have already been cited with favor in at least one lower court in another
Circuit.1 39 However, they have sparked some fierce commentary in law
reviews. One author, for instance, chastises the Sandison court for fail-
ing "to assess whether an individualized waiver [of the over-19 rule] is a
reasonable accommodation" and argues that courts need to be more
willing to accommodate the needs of disabled athletes in general, in or-
der "to further the goals of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act to elimi-
nate the neglect and discrimination of disabled individuals."' 4 ° A fellow
commentator has been more specific, urging the adoption (by the Fifth
135. Id. at 931.
136. See Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 931. It should be noted that the case was accompanied by a
strong dissent. The dissent argued that the court was obligated to look at the reasons behind
the over-19 rule and make an individual assessment of the plaintiff to see if "the age require-
ment could be modified for this individual player without doing violence to the admittedly
salutary purposes underlying the age rule." Id. at 932 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting). If so, the
dissent reasoned, then it cannot be " 'essential' to the nature of the program or activity to
refuse to modify the rule." Id. at 932-33 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion
was cited with favor in Johnson. See 899 F. Supp. at 585.
137. Sandison, 64 F.3d 1026.
138. Id. at 1035-37.
139. Reaves v. Mills, 904 F. Supp. 120, 123 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
140. Thomas, supra note 19, at 757, 762.
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Circuit) of the "case-by-case" analysis used in Johnson, Buchanan, and
Dennin which weighs the individual interest of the disabled student and
the purposes of the over-19 rule. 4 ' This author also urges high school
athletic associations to adopt their own waiver procedures that apply to
the disabled, dismissing the additional work required as "not an undue
burden," but conversely mandated by the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA.142
Despite the voices of these critics, the trend represented by Pottgen
and Sandison seems to comport with the views of one eminent sports law
scholar. Professor Mitten argues that a sports organization does not
have to substantially modify its standards by changing its rules of play or
reducing the quality of team play to enable a disabled athlete to partici-
pate, given Supreme Court precedent. 43 Furthermore, he states that a
disabled "athlete is not 'otherwise qualified' if physically unable to per-
form or function effectively in a particular sport," and organizations may
validly exclude disabled athletes for safety reasons.'" These arguments,
along with the Pottgen and Sandison decisions themselves, seem to raise
the bar on the definition of "reasonable accommodations" and "reason-
able modifications" for plaintiffs. Thus, it is not clear from the high
school cases alone that Casey Martin would have an easy time in his
simple request to waive the "no cart" rule of the PGA.
2. The College Cases
Resort to the federal disability discrimination laws has also begun to
appear in college sports. Several federal district courts have found them-
selves deciding what is a reasonable accommodation or modification in
this setting. Unfortunately for the sake of clarity, the results are diverse.
A landmark case in this area is the 1995 district court decision in Pahulu
v. University of Kansas.145 Pahulu had a scholarship to play football at
Kansas.' 46 During a scrimmage, he suffered a hit to the head. 47 After-
141. See Kasperski, supra note 20, at 193-94.
142. Id. at 194-96. Kasperski notes with favor that the Colorado High School Activities
Association has already "demonstrated such foresight in developing such a process." Id. at
194.
143. See Mitten, supra note 91, at 18 (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397 (1979) and Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)). For example, Mitten
states that "it is not necessary to require able-bodied athletes to use wheelchairs to enable
paraplegics to play college basketball." Id.
144. Id. at 18.
145. 897 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Kan. 1995).
146. See id. at 1388.
147. See id.
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ward, the team doctors determined that he had a congenitally narrow
cervical canal and disqualified him from the team.148 Pahulu went to sev-
eral other doctors on his own, all of whom said it was safe for him to
play, but the team still barred him. 14 9 He sued under the Rehabilitation
Act, asking that he be allowed to play.' 50 The court's ruling on his claim
is revealing:
[T]his court finds that for Pahulu, intercollegiate football may be
a major life activity, i.e., learning. The defendants' action, how-
ever, is not a substantial limitation upon the plaintiff's opportu-
nity to learn .... [T]here are a myriad of other educational
opportunities available to Pahulu at KU. Consequently, Pahulu is
not disabled ....
Even if the plaintiff is disabled, he is not otherwise qualified ....
Whether a person is "otherwise qualified" ... primarily is a fac-
tual inquiry .... The defendants argue that Pahulu must satisfy
the program's requirements, e.g., medical clearance for participa-
tion, in order to be otherwise qualified ....
[T]he conclusion of the KU physicians, although conservative, is
reasonable and rational. Thus, the defendants' decision regarding
disqualification has a rational and reasonable basis and is sup-
ported by substantial competent evidence for which the court is
unwilling to substitute its own judgment.' 51
Another federal district court took a similarly dim view of a plain-
tiff's claim in the 1997 case of Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic As-
sociation.'52 Bowers, a learning disabled student, wished to play football
at Temple University.'53 However, the NCAA required students to fin-
ish "core course" requirements while in high school before eligibility for
college football could be granted.'54 When he applied, the NCAA's
Clearinghouse (set up to review academic qualifications of players) ruled
that he had only met three of the requisite thirteen core course require-
ments, which made him ineligible for college football.155 Bowers, claim-
ing that the failure to meet the core course requirements stemmed from
148. See id.
149. See id. at 1388-89.
150. See Pahula, 897 F.Supp at 1389
151. Id at 1393-94.
152. 974 F. Supp. 459 (D.N.J. 1997)
153. See id. at 462.
154. See id at 461.
155. See id at 463.
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his disability, sued the NCAA under the ADA, seeking a waiver of the
core course requirements. 156 The court was not sympathetic:
Eligibility requirements are "essential" or "necessary" when they
are reasonably necessary to accomplish the purposes of a pro-
gram. The basic purpose of the NCAA is to maintain intercollegi-
ate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and to
assure that those individuals representing an institution in inter-
collegiate athletics competition maintain satisfactory progress in
their education ....
[T]he NCAA initial eligibility criteria are essentially minimum re-
quirements which assure that freshmen student-athletes are suffi-
ciently able to handle college academic work, along with the
demand of participating in intercollegiate athletics during their
first year of college ....
[T]he NCAA "core course" definition [is] essential to the
NCAA's provision of the privilege of participation in the
NCAA's intercollegiate athletic program . . . . [A] complete
abandonment of the "core course" requirement would fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the privilege of participation in the
NCAA's intercollegiate athletic program.157
These cases may have been the beginning of a consistent trend were
it not for the 1996 case of Knapp v. Northwestern University,' in which
a U.S. district court took the opposite stance of the Pahulu and Bowers
courts. Knapp was a basketball player at Northwestern on a scholar-
ship.159 When the team discovered that he suffered from a heart condi-
tion-ventricular fibrillation-it barred him from practicing or
competing with the team. 60 Knapp sued the university, claiming that
allowing him to play with an internal defibrillator (with bi-weekly inter-
rogation of the device) would be a reasonable modification of team pol-
icy. 161 The court here took direct issue with the stance of the other
federal courts. For example, it disputed the Pahulu court's logic (though
without naming Pahulu directly) that a rationality test applied to cases
involving discrimination against disabled college athletes. 62 Moreover,
156. See id.
157. Bowers, 974 F.Supp. at 466-67.
158. 942 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. I1 1996).
159. See id. at 1194.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. ("In deciding a case under the Rehabilitation Act the rational basis test is not
applicable.")
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the judge issuing the opinion took direct issue against other courts by
name (including Pahulu) when he said that:
The district courts, and these are the only courts that have ad-
dressed the issue, are split over whether participation in sports is
a 'major life activity ....
While the issue is not free from doubt, I find that intercollegiate
sports competition may constitute a major life activity. I find,
without doubt, that it is for Nicholas Knapp.'6 3
Finally, the court noted that "[i]t also undermines the purpose of the
Rehabilitation Act not to allow a disabled individual to pursue his cho-
sen field," '164 and "the Rehabilitation Act requires that remote or mini-
mal risks not be used to legitimize discrimination."' 65 With all of these
considerations in mind, the court decided that the only reasonable ac-
commodation was to allow Knapp to play with an internal defibrillator
interrogated bi-weekly. The bar had been lowered much closer to the
ground for plaintiffs like Casey Martin with this case.
3. Tentative Steps into Professional Sports
Though Casey Martin was the first to apply federal disability laws to
professional sports, several cases had danced on the perimeter of this
area in the past. In combination with the amateur sports case discussed
above, these cases may shed a little light on how successful a leap into
the professional arena might prove to be. To begin, professional athletes
had successfully challenged professional sports league rules prohibiting
athletes with certain disabilities from competing on the field of play
under state employment discrimination laws. 66 A prime example is the
case of Neeld v. American Hockey League,67 in which a U.S. district
court forced waiver of a league's rule that prohibited one-eyed players
from competing; the court reasoned that the rule violated New York's
Human Right Law, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of disa-
bility unless the disability is a bona fide occupational hazard. 6 Though
obviously not binding precedent, this case might at least be persuasive in
the Martin situation.
163. Knapp, 942 F.Supp at 1195.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1195, 1197.
166. See Mitten, supra note 7, at 1003.
167. 439 F. Supp. 459 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
168. See id.; see also Mitten, supra note 7, at 1003 & n.96.
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A perhaps more tenuous-but nonetheless helpful-comparison
could be made to the 1992 U.S. district court case of Anderson v. Little
League Baseball, Inc.'6 9 Anderson, who was confined to a wheelchair,
had been acting as a Little League coach for several years. 170 The na-
tional company controlling Little League adopted a new policy forbid-
ding people in wheelchairs from coaching on the field for the safety of
children (i.e. concerns that children would collide with the wheel-
chairs). 17 1 Anderson filed suit under Title III of the ADA, seeking an
injunction against the new policy.172 In deciding against Little League
Baseball, the court chastised it for enacting a blanket policy without en-
gaging in an individual assessment over whether Anderson was a safety
threat or whether reasonable modifications could be made that would
allow him to coach.173 As the court put it, "[r]egrettably, such a policy-
implemented without public discourse-falls markedly short of the re-
quirements enunciated in the Americans with Disabilities Act and its
implementing regulations."' 74 The link to Casey Martin might not seem
obvious, but here was a case where an employee in a sports setting was
granted relief by the court, all because a sports league had implemented
a blanket policy which banned him from participating. 75 The bar had
apparently been lowered again for Martin.
IV. THE CASEY MARTIN CASE
Given this sometimes confusing and diverse case history, it would be
easy to see why the Casey Martin case was not a slam dunk for either
party. For one thing, Martin could not bring a constitutional claim
against the PGA with any hope of success. In addition, the courts' defi-
nitions of "reasonable modification" and "fundamental alteration"
under Title III and similar statutory provisions had been murky at best,
for no consensus had been reached across the nation. Furthermore, no
court had directly applied Title III to the world of professional sports,
and it remained to be seen whether this setting would make a difference
169. 794 F. Supp. 342 (D. Ariz. 1992).
170. See id. at 343.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 344.
173. See id. at 345.
174. Anderson, 794 F.Supp at 345.
175. The judge in the Casey Martin court case actually alluded to this scenario when he
asked rhetorically in support of Martin's claims the following: "What about a disabled man-
ager of a team? May the St. Louis Cardinals refuse to construct a wheelchair ramp to the
visitor's dugout to accommodate a disabled manager of the Chicago Cubs simply because
spectators cannot go into the dugout?" Martin, 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1327.
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in defining the relevant terms. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, no
case had directly applied Title I to sports leagues. It remained to be seen
whether these organizations would indeed be seen by a court as employ-
ers subject to the ADA's prohibition of employment discrimination.
On top of the indecisive history of caselaw governing disabled ath-
letes, the Martin case presented two unusual litigants: Martin himself
and the PGA. The unique characteristics of these two parties, as with
many court cases, would help guide the court's decision. Thus, a greater
understanding of the two litigants is helpful.
A. The Litigants
1. The Professional Golf Association
Evidence of golf in America dates back to 1659, when some historical
accounts relate the game being played in upstate New York. 7 6 Similar
accounts discuss the game being played around Savannah, Georgia, and
Charleston, South Carolina, by early settlers.177 After 1811, these ac-
counts disappeared in newspaper stories, and the curiosity seems to have
died out.178 The history of golf in America really begins on February 22,
1888, when six men assembled in a cow pasture in Yonkers, New York
with a set of golf clubs and balls brought back from Scotland by Robert
Lockhart.17 9 By November of 1888 the men had come to enjoy this new
pastime so much that they decided to form a club that would provide
funds for maintenance of the pastureland course and "cement the com-
radeship that had evolved among the handful of golf lovers."' Accord-
ingly, they adopted a set of simple resolutions-a sort of "Magna Carta"
of American golf according to historians.'"' This simple act would prove
to spark an amazing growth of the sport. By the dawn of the twentieth
century, the number of organized golf clubs would reach one
thousand.8 2
In the first two or three decades after its birth in Yonkers, golf had no
pro tour."" In 1916, however, the PGA was founded.' Though it was
not even close to being a labor union that would protect the players, the
176. See AL BARRow, GOLF'S GOLDEN GR'ND: THE HISTORY OF THE TOUR 28 (1974).
177. See id.
178. See GEORGE PEPER, GOLF iN AmERcA: Tim FiRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 8 (1988).
179. See id. at 8-9.
180. Id. at 11-12.
181. See id. at 12.
182. See id.
183. See PEPER, supra note 178, at 57.
184. See BARKow, supra note 176, at 56.
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PGA gave the pros an organizational entity, with a constitution, bylaws,
and its own seal. 85 The early tour was not very successful, and the pro-
fessionals who played on it were not very good compared to their coun-
terparts in Europe. 86 To add to the problem, the PGA almost
immediately split into two camps-touring pros and teaching pros.187
The war between these two camps raged for thirty years, and gave the
game a poor public image.""' By the late 1940's, however, players began
to understand the value of a good image, and good behavior began to
prevail among all members of the PGA. 8 9 The arrival of television cov-
erage in 1954, however, was the real unifying force in the PGA, and the
game has grown tremendously in power and money since that time.' 90
By 1967, the PGA had grown so powerful that the players owned the
television rights to all tournaments in which they participated, were able
to control many aspects of production (such as choice of networks, an-
nouncers, and advertisers), and oversaw the budget priorities of the
PGA itself.' 91
Despite its sometimes rancorous past, pro golf remains a sport ruled
by tradition. 92 At the heart of this tradition are the rigid rules by which
pro golf governs itself.' 9 The PGA "has a powerful interest in the clear
[enforcement] of its rules"'1 94 and has seldom been swayed to bend its
rules in matters of personal safety or comfort.195 Many of the PGA's
185. See id. at 57.
186. See PEPER, supra note 178, at 57.
187. See id. at 69.
188. See BARKOW, supra note 176, at 98.
189. See id. at 104. For example, by this time players had agreed to a code of conduct
which prohibited, among other things, criticizing golf courses in public; however, the players
refused to support a prohibition of profanity! See id.
190. See id. at 248, 250-51.
191. See BARKOW, supra note 176, at 254-55.
192. See Maloney, supra note 2 (quoting pro golfer Lonnie Nielsen: "It's such a game of
tradition. Walking and having a caddie is the way the game has been played for years. I don't
know how important tradition is in a decision like [the Casey Martin case], but when people
think of golf on the uppermost levels, that's how we envision the game being played."); see
generally EBERL, supra note 1.
193. See EBERL, supra note 1, at 3.
194. Id. at 8.
195. See id. at 23. Eberl offers this as an (amusing but true) example:
[Tiwo players on the final nine holes arrived at a teeing area where they discovered
some water buffalo placidly grazing. The beasts glanced at the players with bleak and
suspicious eyes. The players, properly apprehensive, decided to forego that tee area
and headed for the forward tees, from where they played, far removed from the buf-
falo. Upon their return to the clubhouse when their rounds were completed, the tvo
men turned in their scorecards to the committee and amiably reported the incident
with the animals.
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rule decisions have involved questions of equipment (such as golf carts)
and these questions have also supplied the biggest headaches for the
PGA over its history.'96 Despite the rigidity of many of the rules gov-
erning PGA play, the general game of golf is also inherently subject to
notions of equity, both in deciding on rules questions themselves and in
attempting to equalize competition between players.1 97 As one author
has put it, "[t]he underlying philosophy of all this is to create equity
among players of contrasting abilities, thus, in theory at least, increasing
the pleasure for everyone. '  This is an interesting notion when one
considers the situation that Casey Martin found himself, a dilemma that
could go either way under this philosophy.
When looking at the history of the PGA, it is helpful to examine two
areas that have often touched it-charges of discrimination and its deal-
ings with the disabled-sometimes with results that are germane here.
On the discrimination front, when the PGA was born in 1916, its consti-
tution required members to be of the Caucasian race. 99 It took until
1961 to get that clause removed from the constitution.20 0 Remnants of
that policy lingered, however. As late as 1973, eighteen U.S. congress-
men sent a letter to the PGA complaining that a "form of subtle discrim-
ination taints the image of the tournament and brings no credit to the
world of professional golf."'2' Amazingly, "no black man was invited to
[one of the premier pro tournaments,] The Masters, until 1975. ' '2°2
These incidents may have contributed to a negative public image for the
PGA, one that advertises a willingness to discriminate, whether the sub-
ject is race or disability, and may explain some of the public debate that
accompanied the Casey Martin case.
To their astonishment, they were disqualified from the tournament for playing from
outside the teeing ground.
Id.
196. See id. at 112. It is interesting to note that the rigidness of the PGA's rules, espe-
cially on the use of golf carts in its tournaments, comes at a time when the use of caddies is
dying out on most golf courses and golf carts are becoming the norm. See id. at 55.
197. See id. at 39. The handicapping system, though not used in the PGA, is one example
of this philosophy. See id. at 127-28.
198. EBERL, supra note 1, at 128.
199. See BARKow, supra note 176, at 206. Economics, rather than overt racism, appears
to be the driving force behind this clause; the PGA's founders feared that a contrary policy
might cause them to "lose control over a lot of cheap caddie and club-cleaning labor." Id. at
207.
200. See id. at 206; PEPER, supra note 178, at 69.
201. BARKow, supra note 176, at 216.
202. PEPER, supra note 178, at 69.
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Despite the seemingly unique nature of the Martin case, the PGA
has often had to deal with the plight of disabled golfers, or at least those
suffering from temporary infirmities. For example, Ben Hogan limped
around the course and won the U.S. Open in 1950, sixteen months after
suffering a near-fatal auto accident.0 3 In 1954, in the first televised
PGA tournament, Ed Furgol won the U.S. Open despite having a
withered left arm from a childhood accident.2 0 4 In the 1964 U.S. Open,
Ken Venturi literally staggered his way through the last nine holes of
play after finishing eighteen holes in sweltering heat, nearly collapsing at
the end but pulling off an unlikely victory. 5 The drama of incidents
such as these had largely endeared the PGA to the public,20 6 but the tide
may have begun to change by the 1980's. By then, the cart issue had
become a reality for disabled players. In 1987, Charlie Owens, who had
been injured in a parachuting incident while in the Army, petitioned for
use of a cart during a professional tournament. 7 When permission was
denied, Owens walked the first nine holes on crutches before withdraw-
ing. Similarly, in 1987 Lee Elder asked for permission to use a cart
after he suffered a mild heart attack.20 9 His request was similarly de-
nied.210 Of course, both of these requests came before the ADA was
passed, which put Casey Martin in a whole new ball park (or golf course,
perhaps). Conversely, in the 1990's the PGA has seen players such as
Paul Asinger, battling cancer and weakened by the effects of chemother-
apy but still walking with the rest of the players, apparently without
complaint. Thus, the PGA apparently had some public image factors
in its favor as well going into the Martin court case.
203. See Nick Charles & Don Sider, Fairway or Now Way? Fellow Pros Say Using a Cart
Would Give Disabled Golfer Casey Martin an Unfair Advantage, But Would They Care to
Walk a Mile in His Spikes?, PEOPLE, Feb. 9, 1998, at 48.
204. See BARKOW, supra note 176, at 228-29.
205. See Charles & Sider, supra note 203, at 48.
206. In commenting on these earlier incidents, Casey Martin's father stated: "I love the
stories about Venturi and Hogan, but those stories miss the point. Neither Venturi nor Hogan
was disabled. They had hope, and they had the opportunity to recover. Casey doesn't." Gar-
rity, supra note 4.
207. See Cameron Morfit, Golf Plus, Winning A La Cart While Preparing to Fight the Tour
for the Right to Ride, Casey Martin Won the Nike Opener, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 19, 1998,
at G6.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See Dateline NBC, supra note 14.
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Today, the PGA remains a non-profit association of pro golfers.212 It
sponsors three tours for professionals: the PGA Tour, the Senior PGA
Tour, and the Nike Tour.213 The Nike Tour operates as sort of a "minor
league" tour for players who are less talented or are developing their
skills.214 There are several ways for a young golfer to enter either the
PGA Tour or the Nike Tour. 15 The most important way is the PGA's
"three-stage qualifying school tournament. '216 To enter this tourna-
ment, the young player must pay a $3,000 entry fee and submit two let-
ters of reference.1 7 The first stage of the tournament is 72 holes of
golf.218 Those who do well enough to make the cut in this round move
on to a second stage consisting of another 72 holes of golf.219 The top
finishers after this stage, approximately 168 players, move on to stage
three, which consists of 108 holes.22 The 35 players with the lowest
scores after stage three are given invitations to play on the PGA Tour,
while the next 70 are given invitations to play on the Nike Tour.22' Of
critical importance to this discussion, participants are allowed to use a
golf cart in the first two stages of the tournament, but must walk during
the stage three rounds.222 A player on the Nike Tour can later move up
to the PGA Tour by winning three Nike Tour tournaments during a sin-
gle season or by finishing in the top fifteen money-winners for the
year.' Another route for Nike Tour players to enter the PGA Tour is
to obtain a sponsor's exemption for individual tournaments.224 This en-
tire process is overseen by the current PGA Commissioner, Tim
Finchem, a former Democratic activist.2 3
212. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1321 (D. Or. 1998).
213. See id.
214. See Snow, supra note 95, at 9A.
215. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1321.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 1322.
218. See id. at 1321.
219. See id.
220. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1321.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 1322. Carts are also used on the entire Senior Tour. See Charles & Sider,
supra note 203, at 48.
223. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1321-22.
224. See Kevin Cook, Golf Plus/News & Notes, SP"ORTS ILLusTRATED, Feb. 23, 1998, at
G4. This entire process has changed a bit over the years. Most notably, until the late 1950's,
the PGA required new professionals to put in a six-month apprenticeship, during which they
could not collect any prize money. See BARKow, supra note 176, at 234.
225. See Snow, supra note 95, at 9A.
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2. Casey Martin
If ADA advocates had wanted a poster child, they could not have
asked for one better than Casey Martin, for his life is clearly one of over-
achievement and accomplishment despite adversity. Martin "was born
with Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber syndrome, a rare.., disorder that causes
blood to pool in his lower right leg."'226 Lacking the rich circulatory sys-
tem in this leg that most people have, his bones below the knee have
"become increasingly brittle."227 Despite this disability, he played sports
all throughout secondary school and became an accomplished shooter
for his school basketball team in the sixth and seventh grade.228 As his
condition worsened as a child, however, he "had to constantly ice his
knee, where blood [settled and eroded] the cartilage. 229
After high school, Martin attended Stanford University on an athletic
scholarship, where he played golf from 1990 to 1995 and became a two-
time Academic All-American.23 ° While at Stanford, he captained the
team to a national championship 31 and roomed with no less than Tiger
Woods himself.-32 To add to the mystique, while at Stanford he studied
economics, played piano at fraternity parties (he has long been an ac-
complished pianist), studied the Bible, and mentored a Hispanic
youth.233 Midway through his college career, however, his leg began to
worsen, with x-rays showing erosion of both bones and muscles in his
afflicted leg. 34 As a result, he developed shinsplints and asked the
NCAA for permission to use a cart in the 1994 NCAA Championship in
Texas. 235 The NCAA not only consented for the tournament, 2 6 but also
let him use a cart for the remainder of his junior year and his entire
senior year as well. 37
After leaving Stanford, Martin walked during his two years on the
Hooters mini-tour, though he also sometimes played on the Tommy Ar-
226. Garrity, supra note 4, at G10.
227. Id.
228. See Morfit, supra note 207, at G6.
229. Id.
230. See id.; Snow, supra note 95, at 9A.
231. See Dateline NBC, supra note 14; Peter Kerasotis, PGA's Rule Takes Martin for a
Ride, FLORIDA TODAY, Jan. 18, 1998, at 1C.
232. See Snow, supra note 95, at 9A.
233. See Garrity, supra note 4, G10; Charles & Sider, supra note 199.
234. See Dateline NBC, supra note 14. To counter the pooling of blood in his legs, Martin
was forced to wear two sets of support stockings. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1244.
235. See Morfit, supra note 207, at G6.
236. See id.
237. See id.; Garrity, supra note 4, at G10.
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mour mini-tour because it allowed carts.23 After this two year period,
Martin entered the PGA's qualifying school tournament hoping to make
the PGA or Nike Tours.239 He made it through the first two stages,
utilizing a cart as allowed by the PGA rules.2 14 PGA rules, however, did
not allow him to use a cart for stage three, and he filed for an injunction
under the ADA in federal district court seeking a waiver of the no-cart
rule.2 4' The district court granted a preliminary injunction directing the
PGA to allow him to use a cart during the third stage of the qualifying
school tournament, and the PGA promptly lifted the no cart rule for all
players taking part in the third stage rounds.242 Unfortunately, Martin
missed qualifying for the PGA Tour by two strokes, though he did qual-
ify for the Nike Tour.2 43 The federal district court quickly extended the
preliminary injunction to include Martin's first two tournaments on the
Nike Tour.2" In his first Nike tournament, in January 1998, Martin won
and was soon starring in his own Nike ad. 45 PGA lawyers soon stipu-
lated that he could ride in all Nike Tour tournaments until his court case
was heard in full.2 46 As the full trial on Martin's ADA case neared, his
doctors warned that his leg was getting worse, describing his right knee
as "that of a 70- or 80-year-old," and telling him that he may face ampu-
tation2 47 Meanwhile, Martin himself, when asked why he was so insis-
tent on participating in the pro golf tour despite his disability, cheerfully
replied, "[t]his is what I've wanted to do since I was a kid. '248 The stage
was now set for a unique, if somewhat melodramatic, showdown that
would test the limits of the ADA.
B. The Pretrial Phase
In the months between the federal district court's granting of a pre-
liminary injunction and the full trial, the Martin case received an incredi-
ble airing with the American public, in the press, and among fellow pro
golfers. In many respects, like too many cases these days, the trial
238. Morfit, supra note 207, at G4.
239. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id. About twenty players (of the 168 competing) took advantage of the opportu-
nity to use a cart. Spring Second in Q-School, FLORIDA TODAY, Dec. 4, 1997, at 2C.
243. See Kerasotis, supra note 231, at 1C.
244. See 984 F. Supp. at 1322.
245. See Dateline NBC, supra note 14; see also Kerasotis, supra note 231, at 1C.
246. See Garrity, supra note 4.
247. Id.; see also Morfit, supra note 207, at G6.
248. Morfit, supra note 207, at G6.
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seemed to occur even before the court heard the legal merits of the case,
so vocal was the public debate. For its part, the PGA, in the guise of
Commissioner Tim Finchem, while expressing sympathy for Martin, 49
basically advanced two arguments in public leading up to the trial: 1)
that walking is essential to the game of pro golf; and 2) the PGA Tour
has the legal right to make its own rules for competition. 2 0 (One writer
quickly noted that this second argument was precisely the same justifica-
tion that golf used to exclude blacks for so many years.)251
Some of the first people to pick sides in the debate were fellow pro
gofers. Lining up behind the PGA were such legends as Arnold Palmer,
who gave a deposition arguing that "walking is a traditional and intrinsic
part" of pro golf and that Martin would gain an unfair advantage if al-
lowed to walk, and Jack Nicklaus, who offered to do the same?' Ken
Venturi, who had staggered through the U.S. Open in 1964, argued that
"[t]his is not a case of personality. This is a case of an athletic event,
which you have to do." 3 Tour veteran Brad Faxon was even more
pointed in his comments, referring to fellow pro Jose Maria Olazabal, a
former Masters champion who has suffered a series of foot injuries in
recent years: "I don't see guys in the NFL who have knee injuries getting
mopeds. I didn't see Jose Maria Olazabal getting a cart when he was
hurt. Where do you draw the line?"254 Another pro, David Frost,
quipped, "I don't think it's right.... If he's riding and we're walking, it's
not the way the game was meant to be played." 5 Even Lonnie Nielsen,
who had to abandon the PGA Tour prematurely several years ago due to
an arthritic knee, "joined the chorus of pros who sided with the longtime
PGA practice of walking: 'I feel bad for Casey Martin and the condition
that he has. It's a tragedy ... but I really feel like walking is an integral
part of the game.' ,
Lining up behind Casey Martin were some equally impressive pros.
Greg Norman personally called Martin in the pretrial days, telling him
249. See Maloney, supra note 2 (quoting Tim Fmchem: "This is a very unfortunate system
we find ourselves in, having to litigate whether a fellow we think a great deal of can play the
game.").
250. See Judge Rules Martin Lawsuit to Go to Trial, ATLANTA J.-CoNsr., Jan. 28, 1998, at
C3.
251. See Snow, supra note 97.
252. See Garrity, supra note 4, at G10; Charles & Sider, supra note 203.
253. Glenn Sheeley, Martin Case Not Simple, ATLANTA J.-CoNST., Jan. 21, 1998, at D5;
Kerasotis, supra note 231.
254. Sheeley, supra note 253, at D5.
255. Id.
256. Maloney, supra note 2, at 22.
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the following: "The [PGA] is putting pressure on me to testify on its
behalf .... But I won't make a very good witness for them because I'm
on your side. I hope you get your cart, and I look forward to playing
with you someday."'1 57 The Nike Tour's leading money winner, Eric
Johnson, even provided some legal evidence for the Martin legal team
when he stated that walking actually helped with his rhythm and that it
was a part of the game "only as a purpose to get to the next shot." 258
Fellow pros Brian Henninger and Peter Jacobsen were also publicly sup-
portive of Martin.25 9
In the middle of the road were several golfers who apparently could
not pick a definite side in the debate. Some could see merits in both
sides' arguments. Phil Mickelson was typical, saying, "[I]f we could
make an exception in this one case, I might be for it,... but you have to
ask yourself,... where does it end?' '260 Martin's old buddy Tiger Woods
noted at first that if he had to ride in a cart he would be "off rhythm"
and argued that walking allowed a player to work off nervous energy.26'
Later, however, when asked if riding in a cart would be an advantage, he
said that "it could be. ' 26 2 Even golfers that you would expect to stand
solidly behind Martin expressed empathy for both sides. Specifically,
Greg Jones, founder and president of the advocacy group Association of
Disabled American Golfers, noted that "Casey deserves to have the op-
portunity to try to make a living. At the same time, if he has a cart and
it's 100 degrees and 90 percent humidity, there certainly is the potential
to change the competitive nature of the game. ' 263 Some of those with
sympathies in both camps eventually came up with novel solutions to the
impasse. For example, professional Steve Lamontagne proposed that
doctor's put a percentage figure on Martin's disability (say 66 percent)
and require him to walk a commensurate number of golf holes to reflect
this percentage (six of the nine holes using the 66 percent example). 264
257. Garrity, supra note 4, at G10.
258. Golf Pro Supports Martin's Case, Says Walking Keeps Scores Low, FLORIDA TODAY,
Feb. 4, 1998, at 2C. Johnson's sentiments were shared by Stanford golf coach Wally Goodwin,
who coached Martin to the 1994 NCAA championship and stated that carts hinder more than
help a player's game. See id.
259. See Morfit, supra note 207, at G6.
260. Id.
261. Kerasotis, supra note 231, at 1C.
262. Charles & Sider, supra note 203, at 48. Columnist Tony Snow reported Woods' com-
ment more emphatically as "It probably is." Snow, supra note 97 (emphasis added).
263. Morfit, supra note 207, at G6.
264. See Peter Kerasotis, O'Neals Ignore Loss, Manners, FLORIDA TODAY, Feb. 24, 1998,
at 1C.
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With all of this open discussion among pro golfers, the press seemed
to have a field day with the Martin case in the days leading up to trial,
sometimes in tasteless fashion as we have regrettably come to expect
from the American media. Hard Copy even offered a videographer sev-
eral thousand dollars if he could come up with a clear image of Martin's
withered leg.265 Most comments by the media seemed to favor Martin in
his quest. For example, Sports Illustrated magazine poked fun at the
PGA by noting that "no one has succeeded at tournament golf by virtue
of his walking ability. '2 66 Columnist Tony Snow remarked, "[A]s far as
I'm concerned, Martin stands on the side of the angels in his battle
against the Lords of the Country Clubs."267 A newspaper sports writer
in Florida accused the PGA of using the same philosophy as first-grade
teachers: "If I do it for you, then I'll have to do it for everyone. ' 268 Even
Time Magazine jumped on the bandwagon when it poked fun at the
PGA's argument that walking is integral to golf by derisively asking
"how many golfers really look like they've done a lot of distance
training? 269
The media was not the only outside body to support Martin, as politi-
cians soon jumped on his bandwagon. The California legislature passed
a resolution supporting his request to use a cart, and the San Francisco
Board of Supervisors praised his "courage and honor in tackling an issue
of great interest to all Americans. '27 0 The original sponsor of the ADA,
Senator Tom Harkin, held a press conference with Martin to support his
case, and Bob Dole publicly wondered if the letters PGA stood for
"Please Go Away." 271
With all of the comments by public figures, it was inevitable that the
public would quickly choose sides. Most people aligned with Martin,272
but the choice was not unanimous, as the public found itself split much
like the pro golfers themselves. 3 Newspapers and other outlets eagerly
265. See Garrity, supra note 4, at G10.
266. Id. This statement appears a bit hypercritical on Sports Illustrated's part, for it had
earlier argued that "in a five-hour round, roughly five minutes are spent hitting the ball. The
rest of the time you're chasing it. Stamina counts." Morfit, supra note 207, at G6.
267. Snow, supra note 97, at 9A.
268. Kerasotis, supra note 231, at 1C.
269. Kathleen Adams et. al, Notebook Winners & Losers Spanning the World, TIME, Feb.
16, 1998, at 25.
270. Garrity, supra note 4, at G10.
271. Id.
272. See Sheeley, supra note 253, at D5.
273. Backtalk: Can Casey Get a Lift?, supra note 3 (reporting that readers were split over
Martin's case and listing some of the public's revealing comments on both sides).
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conducted polls of the public to get a pulse on the nation's sentiments. 74
One polling site on the Internet even went so far as to delineate the best
opposing arguments of the PGA and Martin. 75 Against this entire
backdrop, Casey Martin began to find hope that he would be the victor
no matter what happened, saying, "[I]f this goes to trial and they win, I
don't know if they really win. ' '2 76 With the public relations battle having
been waged for several months now, the entire matter was ready to
move to trial.
C. The District Court Decision
When Martin filed his request for an injunction in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Oregon, Magistrate Judge Thomas Coffin was
assigned to the case. Judge Coffin's holdings are spread over two re-
ported decisions: his rulings on the PGA's motion for summary judg-
ment issued January 30, 1998,277 and his final finding of fact and
conclusions of law issued February 19, 1998.278 Judge Coffin's reasoning
on Martin's claims are spread throughout both opinions, so a combined
discussion of the two reported decisions is necessary.
Martin based his claims against the PGA on Titles I and III of the
ADA.2 7 9 In his Title I claim, he asserted that the PGA was an employer
as described in Section 12111(5) of the ADA and had discriminated
against him "because of his disability in regard to job application proce-
dures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges
274. See, e.g., Backtalk: Should the PGA Bend?, FLORIDA TODAY, Jan. 18, 1998, at 1C.
275. See Golf Viewpoint (visited March 6, 1998) <http://wwwv.igolf.com/viewpoint/survey/
martin/kangaroo.htm>. The site did a remarkable job in summarizing the valid legal and pub-
lic relations arguments that this paper has highlighted. To be specific, the site listed the PGA's
arguments as: 1) Riding a golf cart is a decided advantage to a player; 2) Walking is integral to
the spirit and conduct of the game of golf; 3) The PGA Tour should be able to decide on its
own destiny without the interference of the court; 4) Professional sports are not the place for
accommodations to be made for disabled people; 5) Allowing Casey Martin to ride diminishes
the achievement of players like Ben Hogan and Ken Venturi; and 6) Carts were never a part
of the game before the 1960's and should not be now. Conversely, the site listed Martin's
arguments as: 1) The PGA Tour already uses carts on the Senior Tour and as shuttles between
certain holes to speed play; 2) The ADA requires that accommodations for disabled players be
made; the PGA is a public place and employer and must adhere; 3) Riding a cart is not an
advantage; in many ways it is a disadvantage; 4) Modem courses are designed with golf carts
in mind; 5) Walking is no longer part of the game; and 6) Most players would not use a cart
even if they could. See id.
276. Morfit, supra note 207, at G6.
277. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. 1320.
278. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. 1242.
279. See 984 F. Supp. at 1323.
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of employment."2 ' In ruling on this Title I claim, the court did not have
to decide whether Martin was indeed "disabled," for the PGA chose not
to contest this issue.281 Thus, the only real issue to decide under the Title
I claim was whether the PGA is an employer at all, which would deter-
mine if it was even capable of employment discrimination.2 2 Surpris-
ingly, the judge made very short work of this issue by issuing just one
sentence: "As I reject (without detailed elaboration) plaintiff's claim that
he is a PGA Tour employee... I will discuss only his remaining claim
.. under Title III. ' 283
Judge Coffin's cursory treatment of the Title I claim is surprising be-
cause he could have easily cited past cases dealing with the issue of
whether a non-profit sports association is an employer or not. A prime
example is the case of Graves v. Women's Professional Rodeo Associa-
tion, Inc.,284 a Title VII case. (Though falling under a different statute,
courts have long analogized ADA claims to Title VII cases when defin-
ing "employer."'). Graves put the issue as follows:
[E]xistence of . .. coverage requires a two-part analysis. The
claimant must first demonstrate that the defendant is a covered
employer within the meaning of [the statute], thus conferring sub-
ject matter jurisdiction on the court. After that is determined,
and only if it is determined affirmatively, the claimant must
demonstrate the existence of an employment-type relationship
which he alleges is being unlawfully interfered with by the
defendant.
In the case at hand, the defendant is a voluntary association
whose members pay dues. The WPRA does not pay wages, with-
hold taxes, or provide insurance. The WPRA has a comprehen-
sive set of rules and regulations that are to be followed by
members who wish to compete in a particular contest. The
WPRA cannot tell its members when and where to participate.
Rather the members elect when to compete. This association dif-
fers little from numerous other associations, i.e. golfing associa-
tions, bowling association, etc. The members of the association
who compete agree to abide by the association's rules. In other
words, the competing members agree to "play by the rules."
280. Id.
281. See 994 F. Supp. at 1244.
282. See 984 F. Supp. at 1323.
283. 994 F. Supp. at 1247 & n.7.
284. 708 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Ark. 1989).
285. See COLKER, supra note 26, at 229-42 (citing Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826
(D.C. Cir. 1979) & Doe v. Shapiro, 852 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Pa. 1994)).
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[P]laintiff could not have met the second prong of the test. The
existence of an employment-type relationship is of crucial signifi-
cance for those seeking to redress alleged discriminatory actions
.... Here the only interference alleged is plaintiff's inability to
participate in a competition for prize money. As such, plaintiff
has not shown the existence of an employment-type
relationship.286
Inclusion of this explanation would have done much to explain Judge
Coffin's decision on Martin's Title I claims.
Martin's Title III claims consisted of two parts. First, he claimed that
the PGA was subject to Section 12189 of the ADA, which requires that
"any person [offering] examinations or courses related to applications,
licensing, certification, or credentialing for.., professional or trade pur-
poses shall [do so] in a place and manner accessible to persons with disa-
bilities." 7  Again, Judge Coffin made incredibly short work of this
claim, rejecting it in one brief sentence without any elaboration.2 18 Thus,
the overwhelming majority of his decision encompassed Martin's final
Title III claim, that the PGA was subject to ADA Section 12182's prohi-
bition of discrimination in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or
leases to) or operates a place of public accommodation. 8 9
The PGA raised three defenses to Martin's remaining Title III
claim.29° First, it asserted that it was exempt from Title III as a private
club under Section 12187.291 In making this assertion, PGA lawyer Wil-
liam Maledon argued that the PGA was analogous to the Boy Scouts
and should be similarly exempt from Title 111.292 The court looked at
286. 708 F. Supp. at 236-38 (emphasis added). On appeal, the Eighth Circuit stated the
following: "We find no flaw in the District Court's analysis and may affirm because we, too,
find that the relationship between WPRA and its members categorically resists classification
as 'employment' according to the ordinary usage of that term." Graves v. Women's Prof l
Rodeo Ass'n, Inc., 907 F.2d 71, 72-73 (8th Cir. 1990).
287. 984 F. Supp. at 1323.
288. See 994 F. Supp. at 1247 & n.7.
289. See 984 F. Supp. at 1323.
290. See id.; 994 F. Supp. at 1244. One defense the PGA did not use was the "direct
threat" argument (i.e. that Martin's participation in the PGA tournaments under any circum-
stances would pose a significant risk to his own health). See infra sections I.B.1 and I.B.2 for a
general discussion of this defense. For a discussion of the "direct threat" problem in Casey
Martin's specific situation, see Eldon L. Ham, When Athletes Want to Play But Doctors Say
No, It's Off to Court, Cm. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 20, 1998, at 6.
291. See 984 F. Supp. at 1323.
292. See PGA, Martin Head to Court, FLORIDA TODAY, Jan. 27, 1998, at 1C.
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seven factors used to determine whether an entity qualifies as a private
club: 1) genuine selectivity; 2) membership control; 3) history of the or-
ganization; 4) use of facilities by non-members; 5) the club's purpose; 6)
whether the club advertises for members; and 7) whether the club is non-
profit.293 Finding marked differences between the PGA and the Boy
Scouts when looking at these factors, the court rejected the PGA's de-
fense, finding it much more akin to a "commercial enterprise" than a
private club. 94
In its second defense to Martin's remaining Title III claim, the PGA
argued that it was not a place of public accommodation at all because
the courses it operates are not open to the general public between the
boundaries of play during tournaments.295 The court rejected this argu-
ment as "flawed" for several reasons.2 96 First, it noted that Section
12181(7) of the ADA specifically included golf courses on its list of pub-
lic accommodations.297 Secondly, the court noted that the PGA's argu-
ment would render the private club exemption virtually irrelevant in
many cases.298 Finally, the court noted that the ADA and its associated
regulations "do not support the concept that places of public accommo-
dation have zones of ADA application, ' 299 while chastising the PGA for
overlooking the fact that "people other than its own Tour members [such
as caddies] are allowed within the boundary lines of play during its
tournaments. 3 0
The PGA's final defense to Martin's Title III public accommodation
claim-that allowing Martin to use a cart would not be reasonable be-
cause it would mark a fundamental alteration of the game-occupied the
greatest portion of the court's attention.30 ' On this issue, the court cited
such cases as Sandison and Pottgen, noting that-despite the holdings for
the defendant in these cases-"the courts examined the purpose of each
of the rules in question to determine if the requested modification was
293. See 984 F. Supp. at 1324-26.
294. See id. at 1323.
295. See id. at 1326.
296. Id. at 1326-27.
297. See id. at 1326.
298. See 984 F. Supp. at 1326.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1326-27. In comparison, one federal appeals court has found that the National
Football League is not a place of public accommodation. Ted Curtis, "Cart" Blanche? A Deci-
sion Requiring Accommodation for a Disabled Golfer Has Sports Lawyers Wondering What's
Next, A.B.A.J., Apr. 1998, at 34 (citing Stoutenborough v. NFL, 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995)).
301. See 994 F. Supp. at 1249 ("[T]he ultimate question in this case is whether allowing
plaintiff, given his individual circumstances, the requested modification would fundamentally
alter PGA and Nike Tour golf competitions.")
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reasonable."3 °2 In attempting to find the purpose of the PGA's asserted
no-cart rule in Martin's case, the court seemed perplexed, for it could
not find any justification for it; as Judge Coffin put it rather succinctly,
"[n]othing in the Rules of Golf requires or defines walking as part of the
game."3 °3 Nonetheless, the court accepted the PGA's proposition that
the purpose of the walking rule was to inject the element of fatigue into
the skill of shot-making. 4 Despite this acceptance, the court stated that
an individual assessment of Casey Martin's situation was necessary to
see if the rule could be reasonably modified, citing past circuit court de-
cisions for support of this proposition.3 0 5 In making this individualized
assessment, the court relied on the testimony of several doctors (includ-
ing Martin's) and the statements of fellow pros (such as Eric Johnson) in
determining that "the fatigue factor injected into the game of golf by
walking the course cannot be deemed significant under normal circum-
stances."3 6 On the other hand, the court, again relying on the testimony
of doctors, determined that "[w]alking for Casey Martin is a different
story," concluding from an individual assessment of his disability that "it
does not fundamentally alter the nature of the PGA Tour's game to ac-
commodate him with a cart. '3 7 In other words, the court found the re-
quested accommodation of a golf cart "eminently reasonable" under
Title III.38 Casey Martin had won.
D. The Immediate Aftermath of the District Court Decision
The Martin decision seemed immediately to spawn as much commen-
tary as the pre-trial hoopla had. This time, however, many seemed more
conciliatory and able to sympathize with both parties. Even Judge Cof-
fin joined in this trend, for when he delivered his verdict he praised both
sides for their arguments and singled out PGA Commissioner Finchem's
testimony for its professionalism. 0 9 "I don't see how anyone can fault
the PGA Tour for its stand," said Judge Coffin.310 Even the Martin fam-
ily was complimentary of Finchem, with Casey's father commenting,
"[T]he thing that's awkward for me... is that I totally understand the
302. Id at 1246.
303. Id. at 1249.
304. See id. at 1250.
305. See id. The court specifically rejected, without explanation, Pottgen's reasoning on
this question. See id. at 1249 & n.10, 1250.
306. Martin, 994 F.Supp at 1250.
307. Id. at 1251-52.
308. Id at 1253.
309. See Garrity, supra note 96, at 63.
310. Id.
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other point of view."'31' Sports Illustrated and other publications sud-
denly found themselves congratulating Finchem for showing courage and
backbone in the whole debate.312 The public, though still apparently di-
vided on the issue, appeared largely sympathetic to Casey Martin while
more understanding toward the PGA. 3  This was quite a change from
the pre-trial stage, when newspaper columnists portrayed Finchem as a
callous Chief Executive Officer and politicians denounced the PGA as a
club for greedy, self-centered athletes.31 4
Despite the amiable comments in these quarters, there were some
who were clearly upset by the ruling. Pro golfers were some of the most
vocal. Fred Couples called Judge Coffin's ruling " a farce. '31 5 Arnold
Palmer worried that when the gates of change open like this, "we may
not have a Tour at all. It may disappear. '31 6 Tom Watson said, "[A]s
much compassion as I have for Casey, I have contempt for the deci-
sion. ''317 And Paul Azinger, who had walked tournament courses while
suffering through cancer treatments, "insinuat[ed] that Martin [was] try-
ing to get an advantage when he [really did not] need one. ' 318 The gov-
erning bodies of other professional sports seemed equally alarmed at the
prospects of the Martin decision 9.3 1  Even a noted legal scholar chimed
in with some concerns, noting that 1) golf has always been a game of
overcoming the odds, regardless of one's individual abilities, and 2)
changes in procedures often look minor to outsiders, but can nonetheless
be very big to those involved.2
In the wake of the decision, PGA sponsors seemed eager to have
Martin compete in their events, with one sponsor predicting that having
Casey in the field "might be bigger mediawise than having Tiger
[Woods]."'32 ' For his part, Casey Martin immediately turned down sev-
eral sponsors' exemptions to play in PGA Tour events, believing that his
311. Id.
312. See id.; see also Rance Crain, PGA Tour Stand on Disabled Golfer Shields the Sport
from PR Bonanza, ADVERT. AGE, Feb. 23, 1998, at 22.
313. See Sportsview Backtalk: Debate Continues After Martin Ruling, FLORIDA TODAY,
Feb. 15, 1998, at 3C.
314. See id.
315. Cook, supra note 224, at G4.
316. Garrity, supra note 96, at 63.
317. Dateline NBC, supra note 14.
318. Kerasotis, supra note 231.
319. See Garrity, supra note 96, at 63.
320. Interview with Richard A. Epstein, James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Profes-
sor of Law, University of Chicago, in Atlanta, Ga. (March 12, 1998). See also Curtis, supra
note 294.
321. Cook, supra note 224, at G4.
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game had slacked a bit after taking three weeks off for the legal battle 2 2
and worrying that other players might be offended "if he took advantage
of his situation too early." 3" Martin returned to the Nike Tour, hoping
to debut on the PGA Tour in 1999 (provided he can win two more Nike
tournaments), according to his agent.324 No matter what his level of par-
ticipation, commentators galore predicted that Martin would now be a
boon to the game of golf, and would attract a healthy following on
tour.31 Advertisers seemed to salivate over the prospects of endorse-
ments by Martin, with one writer predicting that his golf cart would soon
be festooned with corporate decals much like NASCAR automobiles. 26
Meanwhile, the PGA quietly planned to appeal Judge Coffin's ruling
to the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, though it seemed reluctant to
pursue the appeal aggressively.327 As Commissioner Finchem put it,
"[I]t's going to take years for the appellate process to resolve this issue.
In the meantime, let's see how well Casey can play. '32 8 In other words,
we may not see a final resolution to the Casey Martin saga for quite
awhile.
V. CONCLUSION
Golf is the most human of games. In it a man can become the hero
of an unbelievable melodrama, the clown in a side-splitting com-
edy, the dogged victim of inexorable fate, all without having to
bury a corpse or repair a tangled personality.
-Bobby Jones329
There are several lessons to be learned from the preceding discus-
sion. First, the ADA, despite its brief history, has already caused signifi-
cant changes for the lives of disabled people in America. It can be
perhaps argued that not all of these changes have been positive for the
nation as a whole, as some critics have pointed out. The Casey Martin
case points out some of the dilemmas presented by the ADA, and the
deep divisions that this statute can foster.
322. See Martin Not Ready to Use Exemptions, FLORIDA TODAY, Feb. 15, 1998, at 3C.
323. Cook, supra note 224, at G4.
324. See Martin Returns to Course Next Week, FLORIDA TODAY, Feb. 25, 1998, at 2C.
325. See Kerasotis, supra note 231, at 1C.
326. See Crain, supra note 312, at 22.
327. See Dateline NBC, supra note 14; Martin Returns to Course Next Week, supra note
318, at 2C. For an assessment of the PGA's appeal by selected sports lawyers, see Curtis,
supra note 300.
328. Cook, supra note 224, at G4.
329. EBERL, supra note 1, at 97.
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Despite its seemingly unique character, the Martin decision is really
just one in a line of cases dealing with public accommodations having to
make reasonable modifications for disabled athletes. Courts for years
have been wrangling over the level of modification that sports organiza-
tions are required to make under Title III. It appears, given the Martin
decision, that the amateur or professional status of these organizations
matters little in deciding Title III claims. Thus, the Martin case, as a
district court decision, ultimately seems to be but a small voice in the
chorus of Title III claims on behalf of disabled athletes.
The biggest unanswered question after Martin is the scope of Title I
claims in the world of professional sports. Because the judge in Martin
gave such short attention to this claim, it remains to be fully seen how
employment discrimination will be viewed in the world of disabled pro
athletes. Perhaps the only thing one can take from the Martin decision
in this regard is that sports associations do not meet the Title I definition
of "employer." Only time and new litigants will tell how Title I applies
to more direct employment relationships such as sports teams.
Despite these shortcomings, the Martin case does stand as a water-
shed case in one aspect: The ADA has finally made a foray into the
world of professional sports. This event is significant, for it may en-
courage others to wield the ADA as a means of seeking redress in this
field and prepare the legal mind set for this eventuality. Thus, the tepid
steps taken by the Martin case may just be the beginning of a new area
of sports law.
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